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Article

The Political Economy of Judging
Thomas Brennan†
Lee Epstein‡
Nancy Staudt†‡
When John G. Roberts took the oath of office in September
2005 as the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the unemployment rate stood at 5.0%.1 Over
three years later, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates the
unemployment rate is 8.5%;2 in terms of raw data, the number
of individuals seeking employment has increased from roughly
7.5 to 12.5 million in forty-one months.3 Various other business
cycle facts also indicate the nation is in the midst of an econom† Thomas Brennan is Assistant Professor of Law at Northwestern University.
‡ Lee Epstein is the Henry Wade Rogers Professor at Northwestern
University.
†‡ Nancy Staudt is the Class of 1940 Professor at Northwestern University School of Law.
We are grateful to the National Science Foundation and Northwestern
University School of Law for research support; to Errol Meidinger and Casey
Mulligan for valuable insights; and to Brian Cohen for research assistance.
For the project’s website, which houses a full replication archive of the data
discussed
herein,
see
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
PoliticalEconomy.html.
This Article was prepared for presentation at the Baldy Center for Law &
Social Policy at the University of Buffalo Law School, September 26, 2008 and
the Minnesota Law Review’s symposium on Law & Politics in the 21st Century, October 17, 2008. Copyright © 2009 by Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein
and Nancy Staudt.
1. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment
Statistics for Previous Years (Recent Months), http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet?series_id=LNS14000000 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
2. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2009) (providing the unemployment data from March 2009).
3. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Unemployed, http://research
.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/UNEMPLOY.txt (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (listing
unemployment numbers from 1948 to the present).
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ic downturn: consumer prices rose roughly 6.7% over the last
forty-one months;4 the capacity utilization rate for total industry fell from 78.9 to 70.2%;5 and the budget deficit increased
from 2.6 to 2.9% of the GDP.6 Indeed, even qualitative measures have been signaling national economic problems. Consumer confidence, as measured by the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, fell by more than twenty-six points between 2005
and 2008.7 It is no surprise, therefore, that macroeconomists
have officially declared the nation to be in a recession—nearly
every available measure suggests the economy has moved from
a state of prosperity to one of contraction and decline.8
In light of these data, it is no surprise that economic issues
replaced foreign policy as the main concern of voters in the
2008 election.9 It is equally unsurprising that elected politicians have sought to address the growing “economic crisis”10 in
an effort to stabilize markets.11 The executive branch, for example, has taken a series of extreme measures, such as the rescue of Bear Stearns and the takeover of Fannie Mae, Freddie

4. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price
Index: All Urban Consumers, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
(last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Consumer Price Index] (listing Consumer Price Index data since 1913).
5. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Capacity Utilization: Total Industry, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU (last visited Apr. 8, 2009)
(listing capacity utilization percentages since 1967).
6. For a graph charting the federal budget deficit as a percentage of
GDP, see Brookings Institution, Federal Budget Deficit as a Percentage of
GDP, 1962–2082, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2008/0331_
fiscalfuture/0331_fiscalfuture_deficit.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
7. UNIV. OF MICH., CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX (2008), http://www.sca
.isr.umich.edu (to access this database, first log in; then select “Tables” and
then “Historical;” then choose “2008 Annual Table 1” on the pull down menu to
access the most relevant information) [hereinafter CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX].
8. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
9. See Beth Braverman, Voters Favor Obama’s Economic Policy-Poll,
CNNMoney.com, June 12, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/12/news/
economy/president_poll/index.htm (suggesting that voters and the press are
focused on the economy and only a major international event could shift focus
back to foreign policy).
10. George Stephanopoulus, Greenspan to Stephanopoulus: This Is ‘By
Far’ the Worst Economic Crisis He’s Seen in His Career, ABCNEWS, Sept. 14,
2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2008/09/greenspan-to-st.html.
11. See Robert Gavin, It May Take Trillions to Right Economy: Obama
Calls for New Approach, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2009, at B7.
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Mac, and the American International Group.12 Members of
Congress have also sought to ease the crisis with legislation
that would infuse private markets with capital and at the same
time increase federal agency power and discretion to assist individuals harmed by the current economic conditions.13
In this Article, we investigate whether macroeconomic factors also affect decision makers in the unelected branch of government: the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. At first cut,
one might inquire why we should expect any such effects; after
all, the Justices have no authority whatsoever to adopt fiscal or
monetary policy intended to relieve the economic pressures facing the nation—this power lies solely in the hands of the President and the members of Congress.14 The Court, however, routinely decides cases and controversies that implicate the
national economy15 and for this reason the Justices may be able
to play a role, albeit minor, in the nation’s recovery. In fact, a
significant portion of the Court’s docket is comprised of legal
disputes that are directly and indirectly associated with the financial well-being of the federal government, business entities,
and private individuals.16 Moreover, litigants are not shy about
bringing the state of the economy to the Court’s attention: their
briefs are replete with references to macroeconomic issues such
as “economic crisis,”17 “banking crisis,”18 “housing crisis,”19
“high inflation,”20 “serious unemployment,”21 and so forth. The

12. See James Rosen, Fiscal Hawks Say Bailouts Are Killing Free Market:
Lawmakers Have Little Chance to Stop Government Expansion in Form of
Company Rescues, HOUS. CHRONICLE, Sept. 21, 2008, at A5.
13. See David Cho & Michael A. Fletcher, Stimulus Pitch Absorbs Agenda:
White House Delays Bailout Details, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2009, at A1.
14. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; see also LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 196–99 (4th ed. 1997) (noting
Congress’s appropriation powers and the Executive’s responsibility to formulate budget estimates).
15. See FISHER, supra note 14, at 197 (noting cases of judicial supervision
over appropriations).
16. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 87–92 (4th ed. 1997).
17. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 32, E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S.
230 (1945) (No. 62).
18. See, e.g., Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 1, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (No. 84 -1972).
19. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, Parker v. Porter, 329 U.S. 531
(1947) (No. 80).
20. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant at 9, Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360
(1988) (No. 86-1471).
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parties consistently refer to these issues and to national economic factors in presenting their legal arguments in the hopes
of convincing the Justices that they are well-positioned to ease
existing economic problems—and should use their power for
this purpose.
But do the Justices pay heed? Do they respond to the business cycles that regularly occur in the economy? Existing theories of the Court lead to a range of different expectations and
hypotheses. If, on the one hand, the Justices’ primary goal is to
give correct responses to difficult legal questions (what some
call a legal model)22 or if their aim is to advance their own political preferences (the political or attitudinal model),23 the answer is no: the state of the economy—good, bad, or somewhere
in between—will not play much of a role in their decisions.24 If,
on the other hand, the Justices care as much about economic
growth and stability as do the nation’s elected political officials
(the economic model), the answer is yes.25 More specifically, if
the Justices seek to advance, or at least avoid interference
with, the programs and policies implemented to turn the economy around, they are likely to adopt a position of heightened
deference to the federal government in recessionary periods.26
The Justices, in short, will shift away from factors that typically motivate decision making and will work as a team with the
elected branches of government in the effort to advance national economic goals.27
Understanding which, if any, of these three models characterizes the relationship between Supreme Court decision making and economic conditions is worthwhile for both scholars and
policymakers. First, students of the Court have long argued
that legal,28 political,29 and institutional30 factors affect judicial
outcomes, but few scholars have investigated the possible effects of economic issues on judicial decision making. If the
21. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 152, R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935) (No. 566).
22. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48–50 (2002).
23. See id. at 92–97.
24. See infra Parts I.A, I.B.
25. See infra Part I.C.
26. See infra notes 32–70 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 48.
29. Id. at 87.
30. See id. at 103.
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economy affects federal courts in a systematic fashion, then our
understanding of the judicial system and the means by which
the Justices reach their decisions is seriously incomplete.
Second, because the Court decides hundreds of cases involving
important economic issues,31 it is possible that its decisions facilitate—or frustrate—the economic policies pursued by the
other branches of government. Understanding and adjusting
for this possible impact is crucial if Congress and the President
hope to implement successful macroeconomic policy.
This Article hopes to develop such an understanding by exploring the possible correlation between macroeconomic conditions and economic decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases in which the United States or one of its agencies is a party.
Part I briefly describes how each of the three accounts—legal,
political, and economic—answers the question of whether the
Court responds to macro-level events. Because we limit our
analysis to cases involving the United States, we also consider
how each account treats the Solicitor General, the lawyer appointed to represent the U.S. government in the high Court.32
As we explain below, the legal theory suggests a high level of
judicial deference to the Solicitor General, but this deference is
constant and unchanging irrespective of national economic
conditions.33 The political theory argues that the Justices defer
to the Solicitor General but only when his views are aligned
with those of the Court and, once again, economic cycles are irrelevant.34 Finally, the economic model focuses on the business
cycle and theorizes that in recessionary periods, the Court will
adopt a position of heightened deference to the Solicitor in an
effort to work jointly with the other branches of government to
promote growth and stability, irrespective of existing legal doctrine and individual policy preferences.35
Part II explains our plan to assess these competing theories, and Part III describes the results of our empirical investigation. In brief, we find that all three models fail to characterize fully or aptly the Court’s response to the macroeconomy. In
contrast to the predictions of the legal approach, judicial partisan preferences affect decision making, as does the state of the
31. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16.
32. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF
LAW 1 (1992).
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part I.C.
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economy36—a finding that also works against the political model. But the economic account, at least as we have presented it
here, fails too. We find that as the economy contracts, deference
to the Solicitor General (and thus the federal government) decreases; it does not increase as we expected.37
In Part IV, we attempt to account for this seemingly paradoxical finding with a simple conjecture: the Justices perceive
recessions as a signal of the federal government’s incompetence
in the context of economic policymaking and in response adopt
a position of decreased deference to the government. The idea
that the economy operates as a signal with respect to policy
competence is not a new idea, of course. Numerous studies have
documented voters’ propensity to view declining economic conditions as a cue of incompetence which, in turn, leads to more
votes in favor of an incumbent’s competitor and an increased
loss rate for incumbents generally.38 Our findings suggest the
Court acts in much the same way: the Justices use their decision power to punish elected federal officials in recessionary periods and to reward them in times of prosperity.
I. COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF THE COURT’S RESPONSE
TO ECONOMIC UP(DOWN) TURNS
In what follows, we review several accounts of judicial decision making both generally and in the specific context of our
concerns—economic decision making in cases in which the federal government is a party. This last aspect of the study is crucial because, as we shall see, the relative degree of deference to
the United States posited by each account helps us to distinguish them for purposes of assessing their ability to characterize Court decision making in times of economic downturns and
upturns.
A. IMPLEMENTING LEGAL DOCTRINE
One of the oldest and most well-known theories of judicial
decision making assumes that Justices privilege existing legal
tenets and doctrine when rendering opinions in cases and con36. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Economic Conditions, Causal Attributions, and Political Evaluations in the 1984 Presidential Election, 50 J. POL.
848, 848 (1988) (listing several studies that have found that economic indicators influence congressional election results and presidential popularity ratings).
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troversies.39 Under this theory, the Justices are neutral deciders who look to the U.S. Constitution, legislative statutes, judicial precedent, and various other legally relevant materials in
an effort to maximize correct answers to the legal issues presented.40 This theory does not imply that the Justices have no
personal preferences41 or are always in agreement with the
controlling legal precedent,42 but instead holds that they are
willing to set their views aside for the greater social good.43
Many scholars and jurists subscribing to this theory believe, for
example, that judicial obedience to and compliance with the
law leads to the uniform treatment of litigants and thus a perception of fairness.44 Moreover, law and doctrine is arguably
valuable because it enables individuals to predict outcomes and
this, in turn, permits an understanding of social and business
interactions, allows reliance on expectations, creates disincentives to litigate every conflict, and ultimately deters expending
private and judicial resources.45 Finally, many argue that ad39. For background discussion on the legal model, see SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 22, at 48–85.
40. Id. at 48–49; Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 &
n.20 (1994) (noting that the overwhelming scholarly and judicial view on correct outcomes is that they reflect adherence to superior court rulings); Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrainted Team: Hierarchy and
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1612–13 (1995).
41. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 49–50.
42. Evan Caminker explains this as follows:
Deference need not be based on the assumption that the first court
reached the correct result. Rather, the doctrines of stare decisis and
hierarchical precedent are based on the realization that various institutional and substantive values are served if . . . prior interpretations
(whether correct or not) are maintained into the present and future.
Caminker, supra note 40, at 27 n.99.
43. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a
(Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 835–40 (2003) (providing a brief discussion of the values in federal court decision making and in the
standing context in particular).
44. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (1988) (asserting that
the strongest rationale for binding precedent is its usefulness in assuring like
cases are treated alike); RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION:
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 69–72 (1961) (noting the link between fairness and binding precedent); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 652–54 (2001) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is an appeal to a general principle of equality, a cousin [to] the Kantian
principle of universalizability and the biblical Golden Rule.”).
45. WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 60–73 (stating that precedent is useful because it enables certainty, reliance, and efficiency that would otherwise
be impossible); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 VAND.
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herence to the law fosters respect for the judiciary because it
demonstrates that the Justices draw on a body of law that
represents collective experience over time rather than upon
their own political and ideological viewpoints.46
Litigant briefs and oral arguments made in Court are an
important aid to the Justices in their search for the best legal
answers to the problems presented. Petitioners and respondents both present the facts and law in a manner that advances
their own interests, and while this arguably leads to some bias,
it also enables the Justices to gain an understanding of the
strongest argument for each position, thereby facilitating highquality decision making.47 Generally, both parties are on equal
footing in Court, but, as noted above, there is one prominent
exception—the Justices historically have exhibited quite a bit
of trust and confidence in the position taken by the United
States as evidenced by a high level of deference in the opinions
rendered. Throughout history, the federal government has prevailed in roughly 65% of all the cases it has litigated, and this
win rate increases to 70% in cases involving economic issues.48
Many scholars argue this deference is both reasonable and
rational. The Solicitor General represents the U.S. government
in nearly all the cases in which the U.S. government is a party;
he is a repeat player with substantial legal expertise on the issues at hand and has a reputation for providing unbiased information.49 The Solicitor General’s legal arguments, therefore,
are more useful and trustworthy to the Court in its effort to
build sound legal doctrine than other parties who appear infrequently and have no reputational concerns other than winning
the case for the particular client at hand.50 Indeed, the Justices
have such a high level of faith in the Solicitor General’s ability
to present informed and balanced legal arguments that they
sometimes invite him to present views in cases in which the
L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (stating that predictability in judicial decision making
is a key rationale for adhering to precedent).
46. See Hathaway, supra note 44, at 652 (arguing that the public will view
judicial decision making as fair and not capricious if it is based on precedent).
47. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 114 –15 (stating that, through
the lens of equity, a judge can make a more justifiable decision by taking account of the litigants’ interests).
48. See Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl
.edu/index.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Supreme Court Database].
49. SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 1–2.
50. Id. at 31.
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United States is not even involved.51 In short, the Justices appear to view themselves as a team with the other branches of
federal government in their effort to build a rational system of
law and doctrine.52
How does this team theory of legal adjudication account for
macroeconomic trends? The answer: macroeconomic trends are
completely irrelevant to the decision-making process. The
Court’s sole responsibility is to assure that government policies
comply with the mandates of relevant federal laws, and absent
a legal breach, the Court will uphold the government activity
as entirely legitimate.53 The legal model, in its most extreme
form, gives no consideration to the individual views of the Justices themselves or to national political, economic, or cultural
trends unless they are embedded into the law by way of the majoritarian process.54 To do otherwise would be to undermine the
very purpose of the legal approach: Justices would be forced to
study the economy before reaching decisions rather than merely applying the relevant law; similarly situated litigants would
be denied uniform treatment in the courtroom; and perceptions
of fairness would be undermined.55 In short, if economic cycles
could alter judicial interpretation of the laws, litigants would
be governed by the economy and not law at all.
Similarly, because the legal theory of the Court assumes
the Justices rely on the Solicitor General for his legal expertise,
there is no reason to expect economic factors will be correlated
to an increase or decrease in judicial deference to the positions
taken by the U.S. government. Or put differently, knowledge of
law and doctrine is not likely to be correlated with a growing
(or shrinking) economy and thus there is no rationale for the
Court to alter its view of the Solicitor General in the decisionmaking process. He is equally valuable in economic peaks and
troughs.

51. See id. at 134 –50 (discussing the government’s role as a friend of the
court).
52. See infra Part I.C.
53. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 48 (stating that the basic legal
model holds that precedents, statutes, the Constitution, and original intent
guide decisions).
54. See id. at 48–49.
55. Cf. WASSERSTROM, supra note 44, at 60–74 (discussing the benefits of
subscribing to precedent in terms of certainty, reliance, equality, and efficiency).
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B. ADVANCING POLITICAL PREFERENCES
The constrained (and some would argue naive) legal theory
discussed immediately above competes with the political or attitudinal theory of judicial decision making, which assumes
that Justices have political preferences and seek to embed
these preferences into the opinions they render.56 This theory
does not ignore precedent or law-related factors, but views the
development of doctrine as a means for implementing political
and ideological viewpoints and for keeping lower court judges
in line.57 Unlike the legal theory, however, the political theory
of adjudication does not assume that legal doctrine reflects inevitable, neutral, or fair outcomes after full consideration of the
legal issues brought into court; doctrine is merely a mechanism
to realize judicial politics.58 The assumption that the Justices
pursue their own goals and aims does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that individual Justices have little regard for
others and no respect for the rule of law;59 the point of the political theory is that the Justices do not become objective decision
makers who check their personal opinions on legal controversies at the courtroom door.60 Instead, the Justices have personal viewpoints and give them weight when issuing decisions.61
56. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 86; McNollgast, Politics and
the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636–37 (1995) (McNollgast is the collective name used by
Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast when writing together)
(stating the assumption that judges do not check their politics at the courtroom door but rather act to bring policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome).
57. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 79–80 (1994) (asserting that the Supreme
Court uses legal doctrine as a signal to lower courts about the range of opinions and outcomes that it will tolerate); Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate
Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Historical Perspective, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 143, 145–50 (2003) (discussing the operation of preference and legal rules in appellate review); McNollgast, supra note 56, at 1641–56 (discussing precedent as a reflection of political preferences).
58. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 92.
59. See McNollgast, supra note 56, at 1636.
60. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 121 (1995) (arguing that
judges seek to “impose their political vision on society” through opinions and
rulings, just as an artist imposes an aesthetic vision on society through art);
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1472 (2001).
61. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818–23 (1994) (discussing situations in
which judges adhered to their own idiosyncratic political or legal views despite
clear Supreme Court precedent to the contrary and noting scholars’ diverse
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The political theory of judicial decision making does not
anticipate the same role for litigant briefs and arguments as
seen in the context of the legal theory; briefs and presentations
are only useful if they advance the ideological viewpoints of the
Court. Similarly, the Solicitor General does not have a privileged status in a politically oriented courtroom.62 The Justices,
of course, may award special deference to the Solicitor General,
but only in circumstances in which his position is closely
aligned with the preferences of the Court and not because of his
ability to assist in the development of sound legal doctrine. Absent this alignment, the United States will get little or no preferential treatment and will be treated as any other litigant in
the Court. Scholars (and jurists) subscribing to or acknowledging the role of judicial politics in the decision-making process
forecast that the Justices will systematically vote for one party
over another.63 In economic cases, for example, the government
is widely viewed to represent liberal views and thus liberal Justices will show an increased propensity to cast votes in favor of
the Solicitor General while conservative Justices are likely to
do just the opposite. In criminal cases, by contrast, conservatives are expected to favor the arguments presented by the Solicitor General, while the liberal Justices are expected to favor
the individual accused of violating the law.64
Like the legal model of the Court, the political model leaves
no room for macroeconomic factors to affect judicial outcomes.
The Justices, of course, may have strong partisan positions on
macroeconomic policymaking; various scholars, for example,
have theorized that members of left-wing parties are more concerned with unemployment and growth and relatively less concerned with inflation, while members of right-wing parties have
just the opposite preferences.65 But these preferences show up
reactions); cf. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 25–33 (1994) (arguing that if a court believes the
Constitution and precedent are in conflict, it should ignore the precedent).
62. See generally SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 174 –80 (discussing the office
of Solicitor General as a mediator between the executive and judicial
branches).
63. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 86 (“This model holds that the
Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the
ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”).
64. See Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological
Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797,
1803–04 (2006).
65. See ALBERT ALESINA ET AL., POLITICAL CYCLES AND THE MACROECONOMY 47 (1997).
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in the judicial decision-making process by way of systematic
choices in favor of the government or private individuals and do
not change with economic contractions and expansions. Indeed,
judicial theorists subscribing to the political theory assume
that ideological preferences are stable throughout the Justices’
careers66 and thus cannot shift with the business cycle. Although this stability assumption is not explicit in the extant literature, it can be found in nearly all the existing measures of
judicial preference and ideology as well in the empirical tests of
the judicial decision making. Recently, teams of scholars have
begun to question the widespread assumption of preference
stability but no scholar has yet offered a theory to explain why
or when the Justices will alter their political viewpoints.67
C. PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY
As we suggest above, various approaches to decision making stress political or legal motivations, or some combination
thereof. But it is possible these goals are privileged primarily in
periods of economic stability and growth. When the economy
sours and the nation is threatened with widespread economic
harm, there is reason to expect a shift in judicial behavior. Specifically, given the large number of economic cases on the docket and the Court’s role in contributing to national policy
through its review of government programs,68 it is possible that
the Justices will set aside their customary objectives in order to
work as a team with the other branches of federal government
in a combined effort to avoid prolonged and severe periods of
economic setbacks.69 Theorizing that the Justices are likely to
increase their level of cooperation with the elected branches of
66. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme
Court Justices from Different Periods, 42 W. POL. Q. 509, 513 (1989).
67. See Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 806–08 (1998); Lee
Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When,
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1502–15 (2007) [hereinafter
Epstein et al., Ideological Drift].
68. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16.
69. Scholars such as Lewis Kornhauser and Steve Shavell have used team
models to explain or investigate the hierarchical structure of the courts. See
Lewis Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource Constrained Team, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1605 (1995); Steve Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error
Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995). No scholar, however, investigated
the possibility that the team theory of decision making may explain alignment
of preferences between the separate but coequal branches of federal government.
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government in periods of national economic uncertainty does
not lead to the conclusion that the Justices suddenly become altruistic or completely lose their well-defined beliefs and attitudes—they do not.70 Rather, this theory of cooperation,
sparked by economic downturns, implies that the advantages
associated with putting the economy back on track begin to exceed those associated with the legal, political, and institutional
interests pursued in better economic times.
The notion that the Justices’ utility is linked to their level
of teamwork with Congress and the President is consistent
with much of the existing literature on the Court. A number of
political and economic theorists have adopted the team model
to investigate and explain various features of the federal judiciary,71 and as noted above, the legal theory of judicial decision
making itself is grounded in the idea that the Justices care very
much about the development of the law and eagerly work with
the other branches of the government, via deference to the Solicitor General, to create sound legal doctrine.72 Accordingly, a
revised model of the Court that theorizes that the Justices’ objectives include the promotion of economic growth and stability
through greater cooperation with federal policymakers simply
expands team theory into a new, heretofore unexplored venue.
Moreover, just as the idea that the Court will at times engage in a team effort to advance broad social goals is not new,
the idea that exposure or vulnerability to harm or loss increases individuals’ desire to cooperate is not novel. This dynamic—
perceived vulnerability leading to increased levels of cooperation—has been observed in many contexts in both the private
and public spheres.73 Various scholars explain the phenomenon
by noting the widespread belief that individual utility is directly linked to group effort in times of perceived threat;74 others
70. See Dean Tjosvold, Cooperation Theory, Constructive Controversy, and
Effectiveness: Learning From Crisis, in TEAM EFFECTIVENESS AND DECISION
MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS 79, 88–89 (Richard A. Guzzo & Eduardo Salas
eds., 1995).
71. See Kornhauser, supra note 69, at 1605–07.
72. See SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 151–52.
73. See LAWRENCE BARTON, CRISIS IN ORGANIZATION: MANAGING AND
COMMUNICATING 2–4 (1993) (discussing crisis-management as a discipline and
exploring the effects of crisis on different entities); ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND
LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
17–18 (1987); Tjosvold, supra note 70, at 88–90.
74. See generally BARTON, supra note 73, at 32–37 (discussing the importance of developing a crisis management plan in creating a cooperative approach to crisis); Tjosvold, supra note 70, at 86–92.
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argue that cooperation can be explained by the improved guidance and direction that tend to emerge from group leaders in
times of stress.75 But few scholars who study cooperation and
teamwork question its existence and its increased level in times
of crisis. Indeed, when it comes to federal lawmaking, a number
of economic historians have noted the readiness of policymakers to set aside partisan and ideological conflict in order to unite the government and to better address national emergencies.76
The reality of increased cooperation within federal policy
circles in times of perceived danger is not always viewed as a
normative good. Professor Robert Higgs, for example, is highly
critical of this observed teamwork, taking the position that it
has led to an inexorable expansion of the federal government
that is impossible to reverse.77 Others question whether cooperation in the federal-policy context in times of national instability or crisis is problematic because it undermines the debate
and conflict that is essential to a working and successful democracy.78 In this Article we do not question the normative
value of federal policymakers’ teamwork, but note as a descriptive matter that this teamwork emerges in periods of perceived
national threat and that the expectation of cooperation is likely
to exist among all federal law and policymakers, including the
Justices, for the reasons described above.
Cooperation and teamwork do not mean the Court will
work alongside Congress and the President to identify creative
solutions to the macroeconomic policy problems facing the nation. Rather, it is far more likely that cooperation, if it exists,
will emerge in the form of increased deference to the U.S. government in the cases in which it is a party. Recall that the Justices are legal and constitutional experts and are unlikely to
have any economic expertise, or very little of it.79 With limited
75. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1670–74 (2003); Lynn A. Stout, Judges and
Altruistic Heirarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1605, 1624 –25 (2002).
76. HIGGS, supra note 73, at 17–18, 67–74; HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 1–4 (2007), available at
http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6216.pdf.
77. HIGGS, supra note 73, at 67–74.
78. See Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive’s Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1453, 1453–57 (1979).
79. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 263–398 (providing data on Justices’ backgrounds).
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information and know-how, the Court will not seek to participate in the creation of new macroeconomic policy but will defer
to the elected branches of government that have the ability, experience, and knowledge to address economic issues.80 If the
Justices increase their level of cooperation, then we should expect the U.S. government to prevail in many more of the cases
it litigates during recessionary periods. In short, the arguments
made by the Solicitor General will become more trustworthy
and reliable given that he represents the views of federal policymakers, experts in the nation’s finances.
The notion that the Justices pursue economic stability and
growth through increased deference to the federal government
in recessionary periods offers a theoretical account for Court
scholars who have questioned the long-standing assumption
that Justices display preference stability throughout their careers.81 If the Justices indeed do modify their decision making
to take account of national economic cycles, then we would expect ideological drift: both liberal and conservative Justices will
show an increased propensity to favor the federal government
when the economy turns sour. Because decisions that work in
favor of the government are perceived as liberal if rendered in
the economic context, the theory would suggest that, conditional on an economic downturn, the Court will systematically exhibit greater liberalness, but upon economic recovery, the Justices will revert to their prior—more conservative—preferences.
II. ASSESSING THE ACCOUNTS
In this Part, we empirically interrogate the various accounts presented above, with particular focus on the economic
model. Part II.A describes the data collection process; Part II.B
explains our statistical models and our predictions; and Part
II.C presents the findings. As we previewed, the results indicate that the Court responds to changes in the economy—but
not in the way any of the accounts suggest. In periods of declining economic conditions, the Court is less likely to defer to the
federal government than in times of prosperity.

80. Cf. FARROKH K. LANGDANA, MACROECONOMIC POLICY (2002) (providing an overview of the macroeconomic issues that must be taken into account
in forming a coherent economic policy).
81. See Epstein et al., Ideological Drift, supra note 67, at 1484 –87.
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A. DATA COLLECTION
We collected the data in three steps. First, for purposes of
gathering information on Supreme Court decisions, we relied
on Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database (covering
the 1953–2007 terms).82 Given our focus, we retained only
those cases: (1) in which the U.S. government or a federal agency was a party; and (2) that involved economic regulation—
including taxation, securities, and antitrust.83 As a result of
this culling process, the dataset includes 827 cases; the government prevailed (coded 1) in 580 (70%) of these cases.84 The
question, of course, is whether this win rate is constant over
time (as the legal model would predict),85 or whether it is correlated at statistically significant levels with either national economic contractions and expansions (consistent with the economic model) or the political values of the Justices (as the
political model predicts).86
The second step of our data collection process consisted of
amassing information on the state of the macroeconomy. What
we hope to tap into is the business cycle: the repeated sequence
of economic expansion, giving way to a decline, and then followed by recovery.87 From the relevant literature, we know that
various macroeconomic variables are associated with this cycle,
including industrial production, consumption, investment, employment, inflation, and stock prices.88 Nearly all of these factors, often called business cycle facts, are procyclical in the
sense that they move in the same direction as the aggregate
economic activity, although unemployment is countercyclical
and real interest rates are acyclical.89 In addition to timing,
some of the variables, such as investment activity, tend to lead
aggregate business activity (it moves in advance of the business
cycle), while others are coincident, such as consumption and
employment; others such as inflation are lagging; still others,
such as unemployment, are unclassified with respect to tim82. Supreme Court Database, supra note 48.
83. These are represented by values 7, 8, and 12 in the Spaeth Supreme
Court Database. See id.
84. See id.
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
87. ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 289 (2d ed.
1995).
88. Id. at 300–14.
89. Id. at 312.
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ing.90 For purposes of this investigation, we focus on the economic peaks and troughs as identified by the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) Dating Committee,91 the percentage change in inflation from month to month,92 the percentage
change in employment from month to month,93 and the percentage change in real quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP).94
We also included two variables that tap into the general “mood”
of the public with respect to the economy. The first is a measure of consumer confidence and the second measures consumer
expectations with respect to prices as reported by the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers.95 A simple
correlation table suggests that the official statistics are highly
correlated with the mood measures and in the expected direction.96
We also gathered data on the partisan preferences of the
Court, specifically, the proportion of the Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents. Theoretically this variable could range
from 0 to 1, but in fact the proportion of Republican-appointed
Justices in the dataset ranges from 0.22 to 0.89. Our idea, in
line with various political accounts of decision making, is that
(at least for our time frame) a Court dominated by Republican
appointees is less likely to support government efforts to regulate the economy than a Court populated by Democrats.97 Along
a similar vein, we incorporated a variable indicating whether or
90. Id. at 300–14.
91. See Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Business Cycle Expansions and
Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Business Cycle].
92. See Consumer Price Index, supra note 4.
93. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
Hours and Earnings from the Current Employment Statistics Survey,
http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Employment Hours and Earnings].
94. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts: Current-Dollar and “Real” GDP, http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (select link called “Current-Dollar and ‘Real’ GDP”) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009)
[hereinafter “Real” GDP].
95. See CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX, supra note 7.
96. For more information about the data sets the authors created for their
research, consider consulting the project’s website, which contains many of the
data sets and empirical research that provide the basis for these conclusions.
See
Replication
Archive,
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/
PoliticalEconomy.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). Those interested in studying
these issues in greater depth should visit the website and contact the authors.
97. In our database, Democratic courts decided fifty-nine percent of the
cases (n=488) and Republican courts decided forty-one percent (n=339).
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not the United States was the Petitioner or the Respondent in
the Supreme Court.98 This accounts for the Court’s propensity
to reverse decisions of the lower courts, which, in turn, may reflect strategic-political considerations on the part of the Justices.99 Finally, we included a dummy variable for each decade in
the dataset in order to pick up possible trends in the judicial
decision-making process.
B. STATISTICAL MODELS AND PREDICTIONS
For purposes of identifying the possible effects of national
economic conditions on the U.S. Supreme Court, we examine
the effects of the various macroeconomic variables on the probability of a win for the federal government. Because the dependent variable is binary100 and because we observe a high level
of collinearity between the variables of interest,101 we specify
six separate probit models:

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1economic _ cycle j + βX ij )

(1)

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1inflation j + β X ij )

(2)

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1employment j + βX ij )

(3)

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1GDP j + βXij )

(4)

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1expectation _ inflation j + βX ij )

(5)

Pr(Yij = 1) = Φ(β 0 + β 1consumer _ confidence j + β X ij )

(6)

In each model, y is the Court’s outcome in case i in Term j.
As noted above, all the cases in the database involve the U.S.
government and are coded as 1 if the government prevails and
98. See infra p. 123 tbl.1. When the United States was the Petitioner, we
used the variable 1, and when the United States was the Respondent, we used
the variable 0.
99. See generally Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 393 (1982) (hypothesizing that Justices are more likely to grant certiorari when they disagree with
the lower court).
100. For a discussion of models for binary dependent variables, see J.
SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 34 –84 (1997).
101. Collinearity between the variables leads to biased point estimates and
at the same time inflates the error terms. See JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 89 (4th ed. 1997) (“With perfect or exact collinearity the standard errors go to infinity.”).
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0 if the government loses in Court. In the first model, the variable ß1 is a binary variable coded equal to 1 if the nation is in a
period of prosperity and coded equal to -1 if the nation is in a
recessionary period, as determined by the NBER.102 ßX is a vector of variables, including the proportion of Republicanappointed Justices on the Court; a binary variable equal to 1 if
the United States is the appellant, and 0 otherwise; and six
dummy variables to pick up any possible time trends with respect to judicial decision making.
In the second model, ß1 is the percentage change in inflation from a month ago;103 in the third model ß1 is the percentage change in employment from a month ago;104 in the fourth
model ß1 is the percentage change in real quarterly GDP;105 in
the fifth model ß1 is consumer expectations with respect to percentage increase/decrease in prices; in the sixth model ß1 is the
Reuters/Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, which is measured on a continuous scale where higher values indicate a
greater degree of optimism and thus higher levels of expected
consumer spending.106 ßX represents the same vector of variables described above.
If the economic approach aptly characterizes the Court’s
decisions then we expect economic downturns to cause an increase in government win rates. Accordingly, we expect the variables Economic Cycle, Employment, GDP, and Consumer Confidence all to have a negative coefficient (thus recessions, low
employment rates, low GDP rates, and low levels of consumer
optimism trend with a high level of pro-government outcomes).
Similarly, we expect the variables Inflation and Expectated Inflation to have positive coefficients, indicating that as inflation
goes up—or as consumers expect prices to increase—the government wins more often. If either the political theory of judicial decision making107 or the legal theory108 is descriptively accurate, we expect all the economic variables to be equal to 0,
that is, we should observe no macroeconomic effects on Supreme Court decision making.
102. See Business Cycle, supra note 91. Appendix B includes a table listing
the economic peaks and troughs.
103. See Consumer Price Index, supra note 4.
104. See Employment Hours and Earnings, supra note 93.
105. See “Real” GDP, supra note 94.
106. See CONSUMER SENTIMENT INDEX, supra note 7.
107. See supra Part I.B.
108. See supra Part I.A.
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C. POSSIBLE SELECTION EFFECT
Before turning to the empirical findings, it is important to
comment on possible selection effects. For purposes of this essay, we conceptualize the effects of economic variables on the
Court as if they were a “treatment” on the Justices. Economists
label this type of study a “natural experiment” because the
treatment arguably arose due to an exogenous event.109 In this
context, it is clear that the Justices themselves did not cause
the economic expansion or contraction; indeed, many experts
argue that identifying the cause of macroeconomic cycles is impossible—we know they occur but not what causes them.110 A
natural experiment or quasi-experiment always has a control
group, which is not affected by the event, and a treatment
group, which we believe is affected.111 The behaviors or outcomes of the two groups are then compared for purposes of
measuring the affects of the treatment on the population of interest.112 Because the U.S. experienced at least nine recessionary periods from 1953–2006,113 we can think of the study as a
series of nine natural experiments on the Court.
The central feature of a classic randomized experiment—
the existence of a control group to estimate what would have
happened in the absence of the treatment—lies behind the idea
of a natural experiment, which is what this study relies upon to
identify the effects of economic conditions.114 In the natural experiment, the researcher must make use of the differences in
outcomes between the treatment group and a control group,
just as in a classic experiment, but the treatment status
emerges through nature rather than at the hand of the scientist.115 The fact that the treatment status in our study was not
determined by a randomized procedure but by nature, of
course, raises the possibility that any comparison between the
109. DAVID CARD & ALAN KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMIES OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 22–25 (1995) (describing the frequency
with which economists use natural experiments).
110. For a useful discussion of what causes the business cycle and how policymakers should respond, see ABEL & BERNANKE, supra note 87, at 282–442.
111. CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 109, at 22.
112. See id. at 22–25 (explaining how natural experiments work and how
they differ from other types).
113. See Business Cycle, supra note 91.
114. See CARD & KRUEGER, supra note 109, at 22–25 (comparing natural
experiments with typical “hard science” experiments and showing that a control group is necessary for each type).
115. Id.
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two groups of cases will be biased.116 In order to determine the
credibility of the natural experiment—to assure unbiased results—it is important to examine the characteristics of the cases that were placed into the control and treatment groups due
to the economic downturn that emerged.117 Valid causal inference requires that the treatment and control groups be identical on all relevant factors.118 If the two groups differ, then it is
possible that the observed differences in judicial outcomes have
nothing to do with the economy and everything to do with the
type of case litigated in Court or the judicial makeup of the
Court.
For purposes of this study, the average changes in inflation
rates, employment rates, GDP, and consumer confidence are
quite a bit different in periods of economic contraction and expansion119—but this is exactly as expected. The politics of the
Court and the federal government as an appellant, by contrast,
exhibit similarity under various economic conditions and this
offers some (albeit limited) evidence for the credibility of this
natural experiment for assessing the effects of the macroeconomy on the Court.
This comparability cannot identify the unobservables associated with possible litigant strategies that shift depending on
the economic conditions at hand. If either party pursues easier
(or harder) cases given macroeconomic factors, then this fact
could explain the empirical results obtained, not the economy
itself. Moreover, if the macroeconomy affects the Justices’ decisions to grant certiorari or their ultimate decision on the merits, then our empirical findings may be confounded.
For purposes of this essay, however, we assume that we
have a legitimate natural experiment. In further research, we
plan to investigate this important question in order to determine whether a selection problem in fact exists in the study,
thereby potentially raising doubts about the conclusions
reached here. Indeed, this selection problem may exist in all
empirical studies of the Supreme Court, but no scholar has systematically investigated the problem. Accordingly, this is a gap

116. See id. at 23 (noting the possibility of bias in natural experiments).
117. See id. at 23–24 (noting the importance of analyzing the characteristics of the control group).
118. See id. (citing the importance of having similarity between the treatment and control groups for the validity of the experiment).
119. See infra p. 123 tbl.1.
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in the literature upon which we will focus and seek to fill not
only for this particular study, but for all future court studies.120
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
With this important caveat noted, we turn to the results of
our modeling exercise. We find that the variables Cycle, Employment, Expected Inflation, Government is Petitioner, and
Proportion Court Republican are all statistically significantly
correlated with the government’s win rate according to Table 1.
Recall that we included the variable, Government is Petitioner,
merely to control for the Court’s propensity to grant certiorari
to cases in order to reverse them. Our model confirms this, as
expected, but the finding does not go to the validity of the legal,
political, or economic model of decision making, so we set this
variable aside for now.
As Table 1 indicates, and in line with political accounts121
(though not with the traditional legal model),122 the Court’s
partisan composition, as indicated by the variable Proportion
Court Republican, exerts a significant effect on the government’s success rate. Five of the six models indicate that as the
proportion of Republican appointees on the Court decreases,
the government is more likely to win. In substantive terms, the
models suggest that as the Court becomes populated with more
and more Democratic appointees, the government win rate increases anywhere from 12% to 18%; these estimates are not the
confidence intervals but the point estimates of the marginal effects in the models. As noted, however, this finding holds for
five of the six models; politics does not appear to exert the same
impact in model 6, which corresponds to a shorter time period
than the other models, since expected inflation numbers are only available from 1978 onward.
What of our chief concern—the macroeconomy? Well, as
Table 1 shows, nearly every one of the economic variables is in
the opposite direction than we hypothesized. Moreover, the variables Employment and Expected Inflation are both statistically significant at the 1% level in the opposite direction predicted!
120. For a preliminary investigation, see Nancy Staudt & Tyler J. VanderWeele, Causal Diagrams for Empirical Legal Research: Methodology for
Identifying Causation, Avoiding Bias, and Interpreting Results (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author), available at http://epstein.law
.northwestern.edu/research/JudicialBehaviorStaudt.pdf.
121. See supra Part I.B.
122. See supra Part I.A.

2009]

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING

1525

The variable Cycle is also significant at the 11% level in the opposite direction. As the economy cycles into a recession, as employment rates decrease, and as consumers expect higher levels
of inflation, the level of deference not only fails to increase, but
as a statistical matter, it actually decreases. These findings are
robust in various specifications of the models, with and without
time lags.
Variable

Probit Models
Model
Model
2
3
–
–

Inflation

Model
1
.11
(.07)
–

Employment

–

.03
(.19)
–

GDP

–

–

.41***
(.07)
–

Consumer
Confidence
Expected
Inflation
Government
Is Petitioner
Proportion
Court
Republican
Time
Controls
Constant

–

–

–

.01
(.01)
–

–

–

–

–

.002
(.006)
–

.48***
(.09)
-.52*
(.31)

.48***
(.09)
-.50***
(.17)

.48***
(.08)
-.37
(.47)

.48***
(.09)
-.45**
(.22)

.48***
(.09)
-.45***
(.16)

-.014***
(.001)
.34***
(.04)
.02
(.17)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

.33*
(.20)
814
-477.79

.38***
(.09)
814
-479.17

.28
(.23)
814
-476.26

.36***
(.13)
814
-479.15

.16
(.55)
814
-479.10

.29
(.26)
299
-189.45

Cycle

Model
4
–

Model
5
–

Model
6
–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–
–

N
LogLikelihood
Table 1. The Success of the Federal Government in the U.S. Supreme
Court, Economic Cases (1953–2006 Terms). Note: Cell entries are probit
coefficients with clustered standard errors (by Chief Justice) in parenthesis.
We generated these estimates using “dprobit” in STATA. *** indicates p ≤.01,
** indicates p ≤.05, and * indicates p ≤ .10. The dependent variable is whether
the U.S. government or a federal agency prevailed (=1) or not (=0).

As a substantive matter, the effects on judicial outcomes
are quite strong. In particular, changes in the employment rate
exert a notable impact on the likelihood of a government win.
We make this point in Figure 1, which shows the predicted
probability of Republican and Democratic Courts voting in favor of the government (as the petitioner and respondent) over
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the range of employment rate changes from month to month,
with a minimum (worst) (-.66) to a maximum (best) (1.006).
Note that for both types of Court—Democratic and Republican—the odds of the United States or its agencies prevailing
fall precipitously as the employment rate decreases, and this
finding holds whether the U.S government is a petitioner or a
respondent. At the highest employment rate, our statistical
model predicts that a Democrat-dominated Court will support
the government in about nine out of every ten government appeals and roughly seven out of every ten cases in which the
government is the appellee; when employment rates decrease,
however, the ratio falls to seven out of every ten cases when the
government is the appellant and to five out of every ten when
the government is the appellee. Republican Courts too are far
less likely to defer to the government in periods of low employment. When Republican appointees are in control and when
employment rates reach their lowest, the United States has
just a 40% chance of winning when it shows up as the appellee.
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of the Court Voting for the Government as the Employment Rate Moves from Its Minimum to Maximum
Values. Note: The panels in this figure show the predicted probability of Republican and Democratic Courts ruling in favor of the government (as petitioner and respondent) over the range of the values of the percentage changes
in monthly employment based on the model in Table 1. The vertical lines are
95% confidence intervals. All other variables (see Table 1) are set at their
means or modes.123

IV. THE ECONOMY AS A SIGNAL OF GOVERNMENT
(IN)COMPETENCE: A CONJECTURE
What our data suggest—but not our theory—is that perceived federal incompetence correlates to decreased levels of deference to government positions. Indeed, none of the accounts
we offered can explain our results. For traditional legal approaches,124 the correlation between the Court’s partisan composition and case outcomes is inexplicable; for political approaches,125 the correlation between the economy and the
government success rate is equally curious. As for increased deference in economic downturns, the data point in precisely the
opposite direction: increased skepticism.
To explain these rather odd results we offer the following
conjecture: because recessionary periods may signal incompe123. This figure was generated via S-Post, http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/
spost.htm.
124. See supra Part I.A.
125. See supra Part I.B.
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tence on the part of the President and his advisors, the Court
punishes them by altering its level of deference to the government’s representative, the Solicitor General (and vice versa) in
periods of economic prosperity.
Recall that as a presidential appointee, vetted by the Senate, the Solicitor General represents the views of the federal
government in Supreme Court litigation.126 He defends these
views and policies regardless of whether the nation’s finances
are thriving or deteriorating.127 If the Justices view economic
downturns as evidence of policymaking incompetence, then progovernment outcomes are likely to decrease in recessionary periods. In short, rather than cooperating with the U.S. government in addressing economic issues, the Justices will seek to
dilute the policies that appear to effectuate more harm than
good.
The notion that the Justices will interpret variables such
as high unemployment, inflation, or decreased GDP as a signal
that the federal government is incapable of managing the economy is consistent with the extant literature that has explored
this signaling theory in the context of voting.128 Numerous studies have shown that voters assess candidates quite differently
in periods of economic upturns than downturns.129 Voters, in
effect, view bad economic times as a cue that the current government is unable to manage the national economy and should
be replaced.130 The Justices are not in a position to replace the
incompetent policymakers, but they can refuse to implement
their flawed programs.
Given that Republican appointees are likely to maintain
their majority on the Court for the foreseeable future, our conjecture holds mixed news for the next administration. If we are
right and if the economy remains on the down side of the business cycle, the Court may well compound the government’s
126. SALOKAR, supra note 32, at 106.
127. See generally id. at 106–33 (describing the role of the Solicitor General
as representative of the government in front of the Supreme Court).
128. For a terrific collection of ten short essays noting the possible effects of
economic factors on national elections, see Symposium, Forecasting the 2008
National Election, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 679 (2008).
129. See, e.g., Brad Lockerbie, Election Forecasting: The Future of the Presidency and the House, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 713, 713 (2008) (describing how the
state of the economy may influence voters’ decisions).
130. See, e.g., Michael S. Lewis-Beck & Charles Tren, The Job of President
and the Jobs Model Forecast: Obama for ’08?, 41 POL. SCI. & POL. 687, 687
(2008) (arguing that the decreased amount of new jobs under a Republican
President will cause more people to vote for Democrats in the 2008 election).
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problems—punishing it through its rulings. On the other hand,
if we are right and if the incoming President is able to usher in
a period of economic prosperity, the United States should generally find itself on the winning side of the cases it appeals.
But these are big ifs. Simply because our data are consistent with the signaling conjecture should not be taken as evidence of its truth; after all, we developed it to explain our results, as a new way of looking at the facts we collected.
Confirming the signaling conjecture requires—as do all hypotheses—vulnerability. We must be able to prove ourselves
wrong, which is impossible when we have developed a theory to
fit the data. Accordingly, the task before us is to develop a new
dataset before concluding that data confirm the conjecture.
This is not, however, the only challenge we confront. In addition to collecting fresh data, we must deal with the many limitations of the preliminary study we have presented here. To
name just a few:
Selection effects. As we noted earlier, it is entirely possible
that the kinds of cases the government litigates, and the Justices decide to hear, differ during peaks and troughs in the
business cycle. For purposes of this study, we decided to put
this concern to the side. Because this was likely a perilous
choice, in follow-up analyses we intend to make use of methods
developed in the statistical sciences to deal with the selection
problem we confront here.
The Justices’ political preferences. For this study, we captured the Court’s political preferences with a measure keyed to
the percentage of the Court appointed by a Republican President.131 While we believe that partisanship is the most relevant
factor in decision making in the economics context—at least
since 1953, the parties have staked out rather different and
relatively clear positions—other formulations are possible.
Moreover, in light of dominant theories in political science,132 it
may be worthwhile to consider measures designed to tap the
Justices’ ideology (if only as a robustness check).
The political context. While legal and political models are
quite prevalent in the social science literature, so is another:
institutional accounts. These come in different flavors but the
basic idea is straightforward enough: whether to maintain their
legitimacy or to maximize their policy preferences (for example,
131. See supra p. 123 tbl.1.
132. See supra Part I.B.
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to ensure that the ultimate state of law reflects, to the extent
possible, their preferred policies), the Justices attend to the
preferences and likely actions of the elected branches.133 We, in
turn, should attend to this account in our model, incorporating
variables designed to represent the preferences of the various
political actors. Doing so would also enable us to detect whether
Republican Courts, for example, defer to Republican governments—but not Democratic governments—during times of economic crisis.
The macroeconomy. Our statistical model houses six variables to tap the macroeconomy—economic cycles, employment, inflation, GDP, consumer confidence, and consumer expectations with respect to prices. These may be the most
obvious, and the most indicative of peaks and troughs in the
business cycle, but they are not the only ones. In future studies,
we intend to assess the robustness of our findings by considering other possible indicators.
CONCLUSION
Scholars and commentators have long argued that Supreme Court Justices seek to advance legal and political goals
in the decision-making process,134 but for just as long have ignored the role the macroeconomy may play in disputes involving economic regulation. We sought to fill this gap by considering the effect of variables designed to tap the state of the
macroeconomy—economic cycles, inflation, employment, GDP,
consumer confidence, and expectations as to consumer prices—
even after controlling for the political composition of the Court.
Advancing an economic theory of the Court that hypothesized
heightened levels of teamwork, we expected to find that that
the Justices would desire to cooperate with the other branches
of government in recessionary times in order to promote national economic goals. Accordingly, we suspected they would be
more likely to defer to the United States in periods of economic
crisis.
We were wrong. As it turns out, the government is less
likely to prevail in times of recession and more likely to tri133. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress, in SUCOURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 240–
52 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing how shifts
in the political climate of Congress may have an impact on the way Justices
vote on the Supreme Court).
134. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
PREME
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umph in times of relative prosperity. A 1% increase in employment rates leads to a 13% increase in the government’s win
rate, and all the other economic variables, while not statistically significant, show a similar trend.135 To explain these findings
we offer a signaling conjecture: the Justices will interpret economic downturns as signals that the federal policymakers are
incompetently managing the economy, and thus will decrease
their deference to the Solicitor General when the economy
sours.
We propose to test this conjecture in future studies, but for
now it is the larger point that should not be missed: without
consideration of business cycles at least in the area of economic
regulation, the extant literature on judicial decision making is
incomplete and in need of revision.

135. See supra p. 125 fig.1.
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APPENDIX
In what follows we supply more information on our measures of the macroeconomy. With respect to the figures, the
graphs show how various measures cycles with the economy
and chart larger macroeconomic trends.136
A. CORRELATION TABLE
The tables below indicate that the historic values of our variables of interest are nearly all highly correlated and in the
expected direction. The first table indicates correlations for the
five variables with data available since 1953. The second table
indicates the correlations of all six variables since 1978.137

136. Additional data about the authors’ measures of the macroeconomy is
available on their website. See Replication Archive, http://epstein.law
.northwestern.edu/research/PoliticalEconomy.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
137. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data – FRED,

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) [hereinafter
FRED Data].
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B. THE BUSINESS CYCLE
We used National Bureau of Economic Research data to
determine when the country was in a state of recession—the
period between a trough and peak. The table below provides
the dates of recessions occurring during our sample, and the
following table illustrates the cycle of recessions and expansions.138

138. See Business Cycle, supra note 91; FRED Data, supra note 137.
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Date

Peak/Trough

October 1949
July 1953
May 1954
August 1957
April 1958
April 1960
February 1961
December 1969
November 1970
November 1973
March 1975
January 1980
July 1980
July 1981
November 1982
July 1990
March 1991
March 2001
November 2001

Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough
Peak
Trough

Contraction/Expansion
(Months to Turning Point)
45 (Korean War)
10
39
8
24
10
106 (Vietnam War)
11
36
16
58
6
12
16
92
8
120
8
73 (Afghanistan/Iraq War)

140

Expansion

120

Contraction

100
80
60
40
20
0
19
49
-1
19 95
54 4
-1
19 95
58 8
-1
19 96
61 1
-1
19 97
70 0
-1
19 97
75 5
-1
19 98
80 0
-1
19 98
82 2
-1
19 99
91 1
-2
20 00
01 1
-2
00
8

Months
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